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War, Time, and Military Videogames:  






This article contributes to a small, but growing, scholarship on military videogames. Focusing, specifically, 
on diverse manifestations of temporality within these games, it demonstrates that this genre is both more 
diverse, and has greater critical potential, than is often recognised. The article begins with a brief overview 
of contemporary scholarship on temporality, war and global politics. A second section then identifies three 
different ways in which temporality features in military videogames: (i) as a horizon, or historical 
background, against which they are produced and consumed; (ii) as a dramatic setting around which games 
and their narratives are structured; and, (iii) as duration – which may be accelerated or decelerated – 
experienced by those playing these games. These three instantiations of time are then investigated via a 
new typology of military videogames, ordered around: mainstream military shooters, critical military 
shooters, critical procedural military games, and civilian-centred military games. This typology enables us, 
first, to show the centrality of temporal assumptions, arguments and experiences to the ways in which war 
is made meaningful across these games. And, second, to demonstrate the significance of distinct 
productions and experiences of temporality for the critical potentiality thereof. 
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Introduction 
Military videogames matter. As of February 2016, the Call of Duty series alone had 
combined sales of over 250 million copies; its total revenues of over $15bn making it one 
of the world’s largest popular entertainment franchises (Activision 2016). This, as Stahl 
(2006, 118) identifies, is no isolated case either, where ‘September 11, 2001 and the 
ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq ushered in a boom in sales of war-themed video 
games for the commercial market’. Yet, the importance of these games extends far 
beyond their economic successes. As argued below, they also contribute to making war 
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military combat. On top of this, militaries themselves are increasingly experimenting with 
the genre through the production of games (e.g. America’s Army in the USA (2002-
ongoing) and Glorious Mission in China (2011-ongoing)) and the ‘gamification’ of 
recruitment (e.g. the 2009 ‘Start Thinking Soldier’ campaign in the UK).1  
As the influence of military games has expanded, however, so too has criticism 
of their intent and consequences. America’s Army (funded by the US Department of 
Defence), for instance, has attracted considerable opposition because it facilitates the state 
and its military targeting children (Power 2007, 281). Broader concerns, though, also 
exist, with commercially produced games standing accused of perpetuating racial 
othering and promoting ‘recreational violence’ (e.g. Šisler 2008). After years of neglect, 
scholars interested in conflict, militarism, and related dynamics have also begun paying 
attention to this cultural form (e.g. Höglund 2008; Huntemann and Payne 2009; Robinson 
2012; Schulzke 2013), building on, and moving debate beyond, a number of early 
pioneering explorations on the simulated, net-centric nature of contemporary war (e.g. 
Baudrillard 1995; Der Derian 1998; Gray 2005). This literature alerts us to the crucial 
role of this cultural form, and the diverse modes of representation it offers of war and 
violence.  
 This article contributes to this burgeoning critical scholarship. It does so, 
specifically, by offering the first exploration of the importance of temporality within 
videogames centred around war, conflict, and militarism. The article’s argument is 
twofold. First, we demonstrate that temporal representations, experiences and contexts 
are central to the ways in which war becomes meaningful across this genre of popular 
culture. Following Doty (1993) and Holland (2011) our emphasis here is on how 
arguments, assumptions and experiences of time are put to work in the construction of 
war’s causes, conduct and consequences across this genre. The plot, settings, and 
mechanics that players of these games must navigate, we argue, emerge within, represent, 
reproduce, and contest specific temporalities that must be taken seriously.2 
 The article’s second argument is that specific productions, representations and 
experiences of temporality are also vital for the political and aesthetic engagements with 
war they permit their consumers. For instance, videogames that are organised around 
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that can be used to make arguments about militarism’s drivers and consequences. Others, 
in contrast, encourage a critical sensibility, for instance through ‘counter-memorialising’ 
(Ashley and Walker 1990, 410) or counterfactual readings of the past, or by ensuring that 
players linger at particularly unpleasant episodes of violence. To be clear, these 
productions and experiences do not (necessarily or directly) cause particular forms of 
player response to the challenges posed by a specific game. They do, however, make 
certain interpretations and actions appear more reasonable, logical, imperative or 
inevitable than others (Holland, 2011: 50-51). As the background which renders specific 
player decisions possible or reasonable (Doty 1993), different manifestations of time 
within military videogames therefore tell us much about the considerable heterogeneity, 
and critical potential, within this increasingly prominent form of global cultural politics. 
 To develop this argument, the article begins by reviewing contemporary literature 
on temporality and world politics. This literature, we argue, evidences a growing interest 
in rendering visible previously implicit assumptions, narratives, and experiences of 
temporality, and the social, political and discursive work they do in (re)producing global 
political dynamics such as war and conflict. In so doing, it has shown how specific 
temporal tropes – whether ‘new wars’, ‘9/11’, ‘the third world’, or fears around ‘digital 
Pearl Harbors’ – are vital for the construction, organisation, and legitimation of, amongst 
other things, identity and violence. 
 A second section begins by differentiating three distinct instantiations of time that 
recur across this genre: (i) time as horizon, or historical backdrop, to videogame 
production and consumption; (ii) time as a dramatic setting to the plot of particular games; 
and, (iii) time experienced as duration during gameplay. These instantiations are then 
explored via a new typology  which categorises videogames via their approach to 
contemporary warfare: (i) mainstream military shooters, which tend to place the player 
in the role of a member of the US military and place a premium on shooting to succeed; 
(ii) critical military shooters, which employ conventional shooter dynamics, but for 
critical intent; (iii) critical procedural military games, which use alternative gameplay 
mechanics but explicitly force a player away from combat, and (iv) civilian-centred 
military games, which place the player in the role of a civilian embroiled in a war beyond 
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 This new typology, and the comparative exploration it facilitates, allows for 
analysis of the multiple normative and political potentialities of videogames – including 
their capacity to critique contemporary militarism. This is vital, because it extends the 
article’s contribution beyond its immediate focus on imbrications of temporality, games 
and militarism. It does so by demonstrating the eclectic and diverse nature of this medium, 
helping to move debate on videogames and warfare beyond what we term ‘mainstream 
military shooters’ that have tended to capture the attention of analysts and researchers 
(for exceptions, see Robinson 2012, 2015; Young 2015; Ciută 2016; Schulzke 2017a, 
2017b). In this article’s third section we therefore analyse the various ways in which time 
functions as horizon, setting and duration across this typology, and the critical and 
political significance of the differences it uncovers. The article concludes with an 
overview of future research directions around temporality, popular culture, and 
militarism. 
 
Time, violence and global politics 
Any understanding of militarism is likely to prove only partial without some form of 
reflection on temporality. Three examples to demonstrate will suffice. First, justifications 
for war are, frequently, couched in temporal terms; whether looking forward to a (new) 
future – consider World War I as ‘a war to end all wars’ – or backward by reference to 
the righting of historical grievances. Second, war (like all social practices) is made up of, 
and made possible through, specific temporal rhythms, from the scheduling of military 
drills through to shifting combatant experiences of boredom and exhilaration (Basham 
2015). Third, the ending of war and its posthumous existence in commemorative practices 
– from peace treaties to monuments, minutes of silence and beyond – relies upon the 
marking of time (differentiating an old time of war from a new time of non-war) as well 
as the endurance of collective calendars that are shared by, and arguably constitutive of, 
social groups whether nations, veterans or victims (Winter and Sivan 2000; Edkins 2003).  
 Given this significance, it is perhaps surprising that academic fields so dedicated 
to the study of war – such as International Relations – have been relatively slow to take 
temporality more seriously (Hom 2010, 1146; Solomon 2014, 671). Although the 
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no doubt helps explain this neglect (Walker 1987, 66), things have, recently, begun to 
change. This is evident in studies unpacking the role of historical metaphors and 
arguments within elite security discourse – whether in relation to the endurance of World 
War II imaginaries (Noon 2004) or the use of other historical analogies in the George W. 
Bush administration’s war on terror (Angstrom 2011). The allegorical role of specific 
events is a key focus of much of this work, for instance the resonance of Pearl Harbor in 
post-9/11 terrorism discourse (Jackson 2005), or fears of a ‘digital Waterloo’ in 
contemporary cybersecurity discourse (Stohl 2006). Related work extends these analyses 
by exploring how time is ‘shaped’ within global political narratives (e.g. on counter-
terrorism discourse (Jarvis 2009; Fisher 2013)), and by excavating arguments around 
temporal periodisations in tropes such as ‘new terrorism’ (Burnett and Whyte 2005) or 
‘new wars’ (Newman 2004). Such work pulls attention to the ways in which particular 
pasts, presents and futures are selected and plotted into coherent stories or performances 
about international life, and the work these stories perform within efforts to render the 
international meaningful. Perhaps the best example, however, is in the debate on 
American exceptionalism.3 Some view this as a mythical, ahistorical and comparatively 
recent invention (Hughes 2015). Others instead employ it to periodise US foreign policy, 
distinguishing times of assertiveness characterised by national pride and moral 
superiority on the one hand. And, on the other, periods of, ‘widespread self doubt and a 
sense of insecurity that give rise and direction to attempts at social purification when 
domestic problems and international uncertainties coincide’ (Manheim, cited in McEvoy-
Levy 2001, 31).  
These insights into time’s plasticity – and the scope that this opens for military 
action or other forms of security politics – draw frequently upon now-canonical texts 
(itself a temporal claim!) within social theory, whether Maurice Halbwachs’ (1992) work 
on social memory, or Walter Benjamin’s differentiation between clock time and calendar 
time:  
 
Benjamin associates clock time with the linear, deterministic, irreversible and indifferent time of 
historicism, in which political (even revolutionary) action is explained, in terms borrowed from 
Newtonian physics, as the product of material determination. Calendar time is different. Calendars 
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clock, but opportunities for remembrance and recreation that cut across and reinvent time (Hutchings 
2008: 71-2). 
 
Interdisciplinary engagements of this sort have enabled scholars to pay more attention to 
the significance of (often tacit) assumptions about time within established understandings 
of global politics (see also Lawson 2010; Yetiv 2011). Walker (1987), for instance, does 
this in relation to political realism: for him, a more complex terrain than often assumed 
precisely because of contrasting approaches to time within this ‘school’ and its 
foundational texts. Hom and Steele (2010) take a more panoramic approach, charting 
conceptions of ‘cyclical time’ and ‘linear progressive time’ within realist and liberal IR 
mainstreams, respectively. Kimberly Hutchings (2008) concentrates her attention instead 
on latent assumptions about linearity within this field’s critical ‘traditions’. The solace 
she finds in the revolutionary potential of feminist and postcolonial celebrations of global 
political ‘heterotemporalities’, here echoes Hom and Steele’s endorsement of models of 
‘open time’ and the emphasis upon novelty, contingency and unpredictability they 
associate with post-structural, pragmatist, and critical constructivist approaches. Related 
work, finally, focuses on the performance or enactment – rather than narration – of 
presents and futures in technologies, practices, or dramatic encounters emphasising risk. 
Drawing inspiration, again, from prominent social theorists (e.g. Butler 1997; Beck 
2002), this literature charts how potential future scenarios are brought into being as real 
and meriting action through seemingly disconnected phenomena such as criminal trials 
(de Geode and de Graaf 2013) and security simulations (Aradau and van Munster 2012). 
This brief review is intended to demonstrate two contemporary developments in 
the literature on temporality and global politics. First, is a growing attempt to render 
previously implicit assumptions, narratives and experiences of temporality as explicit as 
possible. And, second, is an effort to chart the significance thereof for many of this field’s 
enduring concerns, including sovereignty (e.g. Jarvis 2009; Hom 2010), subjectivity (e.g. 
Solomon 2014), critique (e.g. Hutchings 2008), and danger (e.g. Aradau and van Munster 
2012). This article offers something similar in the context of military videogames, arguing 
that specific (re)productions of time are vital for the construction, organisation and 
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consumers make sense of war, these (re)productions also variously facilitate or foreclose 
critical engagement thereof: shaping how their consumers make sense of war. 
 
Time to play! Military videogames and temporality 
In this section we draw on the critical insights of the above literature to explore three 
distinct instantiations of temporality within contemporary videogames. The first of these 
refers to the particular moment at which videogames are manufactured, marketed, 
distributed, sold, and consumed. This temporal horizon – or historical backdrop – 
contributes, we argue, to the stories and experiences provided by particular videogames, 
albeit not homogeneously. Thus, videogames manufactured and played in a ‘post-9/11’ 
environment – even those focused on distant pasts or far-flung futures – are not unaffected 
by that environment.4 Second, time is also present, we suggest, as a dramatic setting in 
which videogames, their narratives and plots are situated. Such settings may involve past 
events (e.g. the Vietnam War); contemporary occurrences (e.g. the 9/11 wars); imagined 
future confrontations (e.g. following alien invasion), or some combination thereof (which 
may be arranged in a more, less or non- linear fashion within a specific title or series). 
Put otherwise, the strategies, battles, victims and violences of these games – as with the 
strategies, battles, victims and violences in other cultural forms – are located for their 
consumers within some time or times: past, present or future; real or fabricated. Third, 
temporality is also significant as duration in these games – as something which is 
experienced by an individual or community participating in their playing. This 
manifestation of time is particularly significant, we argue, for understanding the political 
and aesthetic sensibilities facilitated by such games. Thus, gameplay mechanics that work 
to accelerate or decelerate a player’s decision-making, for instance, may encourage or 
discourage critical sensibilities vis-à-vis a game’s violences. 
 This tripartite approach to temporality is applied, in the following, to an original 
typology of four types of military videogame: mainstream military shooters; critical 
military shooters; critical procedural military games, and civilian-centred military 
games.5 Our argument is derived from analysis of twenty-seven games, with the 
discussion focused exclusively on the single player element of each.6 This provides for a 
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genres, with examples to capture the importance of narrative, visuals, and gameplay 
therein. As noted above, the typology is also intended to broaden and deepen existing 
research which has tended narrowly to focus on the celebratory militarism of mainstream 
military shooters. Thus, we differentiate between games on their design and aesthetic, 
including differences in terms of their ‘possibility space’: referring to the actions a player 
can and cannot undertake during a game (Bogost 2007, 42-43). Our analysis builds from 
Bogost’s work on ‘persuasive games’ which allow spaces for the exploration of rules 
through a process of experimentation (the possibility space) and can be used as metaphors 
to explore the rules that underpin society as a whole (procedurality), often in ways that 
are highly critical, yet expressive (procedural rhetoric). As Mary Flanagan (2009, 249) 
argues, ‘[g]ames are frameworks that designers can use to model the complexity of the 
problems that face the world and to make them easier for the players to comprehend. By 
creating a simulated environment, the player is able to step away and think critically about 
those problems’.  
 Whilst much of the existing literature focuses on games which are primarily 
concerned with offering critiques of society, our analysis argues that there is nothing 
intrinsic to this theory (and the potential of games) to suggest that they cannot also operate 
in a small ‘c’ conservative way. Persuasion could potentially yield a critical 
transformation but could serve equally well to consolidate the status quo or ameliorate 
against change. Our focus thus is sensitive to the reality view – as Schulzke (2017a, 615-
7) notes – that these games may be read in multiple ways (2017a, 615-7) and contain 
important ambiguities (Schulzke 2017b, 1). As Robinson (2015, 466-9) earlier 
emphasised, even apparently pro-war games can be seen as critical of war by actively 
exposing the existence of a military industrial complex at the heart of the US government. 
 
Mainstream Military Shooters  
Mainstream military shooter games such as the Call of Duty (2003-present), Battlefield 
(2002-present) and Medal of Honor (1999-2012) series are the dominant genre in the war 
videogame field, their releases frequently supported by significant marketing budgets and 
crucial to their publishers’ commercial sustainability. The combined sales of such titles 
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the player as a serving member of the US (or an allied) military (e.g. Call of Duty series), 
and those which Stahl (2006, 118) terms ‘insurgent hunting games’ which locate the 
player as a member of a secret national security team charged with neutralising terrorist 
threats (e.g. Rainbow Six series).  
 These games are typically organised around a central narrative in which the player 
takes the role of a US or Western military operative whose individual agency – and 
heroism – is essential to military victory. The character is frequently engaged in state-
centric war against uniformed soldiers from an enemy readily identified with a particular 
state, most frequently Russia (e.g. Call of Duty Modern Warfare series), China (e.g. 
Battlefield 4), North Korea (e.g. Homefront), or a generic Middle Eastern state (e.g. 
Battlefield 3). A blurring of ‘new’ and ‘old’ war tropes in these games emerges, however, 
with the widespread portrayal of one’s enemies as ‘extremists’ – hence ‘not real soldiers’ 
– who are frequently ‘collectivized and linguistically functionalized as “various terrorist 
groups”, “militants” and “insurgents”’ despite their military uniforms (Šisler 2008, 208). 
Combat in these games, moreover, has a theatrical, spectacular element (see McInnes 
1999), placing modern hi-tech weaponry such as drones, remote and aerial weapons 
systems, tanks or attack helicopters in the hands of the player, confirming the allied 
forces’ overwhelming technological superiority. In this sense, these games blur a 
comparatively ahistorical shaping of global politics as a site of perpetual danger (and, 
ultimately, war) that requires continuous and justified military action, on the one hand. 
With, on the other, a decidedly linear, and unashamedly progressive, conception of war’s 
increasingly virtuous and virtual character (Der Derian 2009). Technological advances in 
these games ensure that the perpetrating of war by the West poses limited risk either to 
the self – the player’s capacity to inflict collateral damage is often extremely limited – or 
to civilian populations, who are conspicuously absent from most mainstream military 
shooters.  
  These games are typically played from a first-person perspective, placing the 
player ‘in the boots’ of a soldier – almost without exception a male protagonist. 
Mainstream military games are typified as corridor-based, first-person shooters, offering 
a relatively linear experience that channels the player through a series of specific conflict-
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these battles; the space for negotiation with enemy aggressors is almost non-existent. In 
terms of time as duration, gameplay is therefore based on rapid and intense battlefield 
action, with a high premium placed on player dexterity. Time and speed are thereby 
‘collapsed’, as these games present warfare as operating through the accelerated processes 
of what Crogan (2011) has termed ‘gametime’: ‘an anticipatory impulse’ (Stahl 2006, 
119) and ‘a temporal aesthetic that favours a discourse of constant action and the 
suppression of ethical reflection’ (Stahl 2010, 100, paraphrasing Crogan). This serves to 
delimit the scope for a player’s reflective or contemplative decision-making, serving – in 
a post-9/11 context that serves as their primary temporal horizon – to collapse ‘the 
temporal space between real world events and the ability to “play” them’ (Stahl 2006, 
119). As Stahl (2006, 120) continues, in relation to the Iraq war of 2003: ‘In the lead up 
to war, for example, the Bush administration pre-empted continued UN weapons 
inspections on the grounds that we were “running out of time”’ (see also Glezos 2012). 
The possibility space is thus relatively narrow in such games, with this narrowing 
reflective of their post-9/11 backdrop which has been so frequently characterised by an 
‘urgency of emergency’ (Salter 2011, 116) and the need for rapid decision-taking. 
 In terms of ethical motivation for the player’s engagement in war, the majority of 
mainstream military shooters present this unambiguously, invoking an exceptionalist 
framing of American foreign policy. The player (almost always representing the USA) is 
typically attacked by an enemy and forced to respond (legitimately), either to a terrorist 
attack or a military invasion. These scenarios – demonstrative of US vulnerability to 
military violence in a post-9/11 climate – thus provide clear and unequivocal justification 
for military action to eradicate such threats (Robinson 2015, 459-462). This not only 
provides a point of temporal origin for conflict within these games, positioning the United 
States as the initial (therefore, innocent) victim and – in the process – camouflaging 
possible explanations for such originary violences. It also clearly demarcates the 
vulnerable self from its belligerent, barbaric others, guilty of unprovoked aggression 
lacking context or history.  
Turning to time as a dramatic setting, in contrast to the other sub-genres 
considered below mainstream military shooters provide numerous commercially 
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(2016)), WWII (e.g. Call of Duty: WWII (2017); Call of Duty: World at War (2008)), the 
Cold War (e.g. Call of Duty: Black Ops (2010)), the 9/11 present (e.g. Medal of Honor 
(2010)), the post-9/11 present (e.g. Medal of Honor: Warfighter (2012)), as well as the 
near and distant future (e.g. Battlefield 4 (2013); Call of Duty: Black Ops 3 (2015)). The 
ease with which such games can move between settings reproduces the ahistorical 
framing of global politics as a site of perpetual danger and conflict noted above. 
Regardless of any particular game’s specific temporal setting, war is (paradoxically) both 
unpredictable in that it cannot be averted, yet also inevitable: there would be no game 
without it, and no sequels to follow. Yet, within this broadly cyclical framing of an 
omnipresent (threat of) violence, the emphasis on causal events rather than processes 
within these games also tends to connect pasts and futures in relationships of radical 
disjuncture, characterised by intense moments of dramatic change rather than incremental 
transformations over time. Thus, as with Bush administration framings of the post-9/11 
world as a time of new insecurity and ‘known unknowns’ (see Jarvis 2009), while a player 
might ‘know’ – or expect – future conflict to occur, the specific timing or modality of 
that conflict remains unforeseen. 
 What is crucial is that whether they are set in the past, the 9/11-scarred ‘present’, 
or the future, mainstream shooters offer procedural rhetoric (in Bogost’s terms) with the 
potential to efface political and historical critique. For example, Call of Duty: Black Ops 
(2010) reconfigures historically problematic interventions in Cuba and Vietnam as 
necessary, justifiable responses to the existential threat posed by a global conspiracy 
amongst communist superpowers. The game’s narrative simply establishes that such 
communist networks did exist, and that they posed a genuine threat to the USA. Call of 
Duty: Black Ops thus presents its players with a convincing, interactive rewriting of 
history in which the actions of the McCarthyite period, the US incursion into Vietnam, 
and the Bay of Pigs operation are all retrospectively justified. Put otherwise, such games 
offer a convincing counterfactual through which to make sense of, and evaluate, now past 
presents. Similar trends occur in Call of Duty: Black Ops II (2012), which contains a 
mission set in 1980s Afghanistan populated by a duplicitous Mujahedeen, and in Army of 
Two’s (2008) post-9/11 depiction of WMD in both Iraq and Afghanistan in 2001. Such 
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permanent threat between the (good) USA and its (typically, non-Western) enemies. 
Their temporal aesthetic reinforces this Manichean simplicity, combining gameplay and 
stories that limit the ethical questions raised by US engagements in Cuba, Vietnam and 
beyond and erasing troublesome uncertainties or ambiguities from past foreign policy 
actions.7  
 In offering our analysis it is important to emphasise that, perhaps surprisingly, a 
number of mainstream shooters do contain an important ‘critical’ undercurrent whereby 
a key cause of war is exposed as originating from the Military Industrial Complex. For 
example, Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 (2009), Call of Duty: Advanced Warfare 
(2014) and Army of Two (2008) all directly implicate the military and/or private security 
companies as direct sponsors of US enemies to protect their own interests – interests 
which are explicitly shown in game to be served by perpetual, techno-centric war 
(Robinson 2015, 466-9; Schulzke 2017b, 942-3). This criticality, however, is diminished, 
or – more strongly – effaced, by gameplay with its premium on rapid tempo, shoot and 
destroy mechanics.  
 
Critical Military Shooters  
Our second category of games which includes Blacksite: Area 51 (2007), Haze (2008) 
and Spec Ops: The Line (2012) utilises the gameplay mechanics of the mainstream titles 
discussed above, but for explicitly ‘subversive’ or ‘disruptive’ ends. Such games may 
provoke different affects (and indeed effects) in (and on) the player, their narrative and 
gameplay, in order to communicate war’s ultimate destructiveness. Although 
commercially oriented (and supported by extensive marketing campaigns), these games 
have proven far less commercially successful than their mainstream competitors, limiting 
the examples available for discussion.8 Thus, where approximately 7-10 games are 
released annually conforming to the mainstream military shooter archetype – selling 40-
50m copies per annum – a critical military shooter tends to be released only once every 
2-3 years, with typical unit sales of less than 1m.  
 As with mainstream shooters, critical military shooters place the player in the role 
of a serving member of the (typically US) military. The temporal experience of gameplay 
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contemplative play, and second, by encouraging the player through a relatively linear 
journey of successive missions. Rather than depicting such actions as heroic, however, 
these games force confrontation with war’s dehumanising effects on soldiers, including 
via appropriation of a shoot and destroy mechanic. In Spec Ops: The Line (SO:TL), for 
instance, this takes a figurative effect with the players’ avatar (a soldier) frequently 
narratively and graphically darkened by war, allowing for the articulation of themes 
around PTSD (Payne 2014).  
Both Haze and SO:TL expose the psychological damage of war upon soldiers. In 
SO:TL, the player’s avatar (Captain Walker) becomes increasingly delusional, and the 
game’s end reveals that the rogue enemy Walker had been pursuing – a US Colonel – has 
in fact been dead for weeks, with the taunting voices in Walker’s head actually products 
of his traumatised and war-ravaged imagination. The unreliability of the player’s avatar 
is a key theme, too, of Haze. Here, the game’s narrative and gameplay involves future 
soldiers consuming a chemical substance (Nectar) which enhances combat focus and 
accuracy while masking the realities of their killings. As the character’s Nectar unit 
malfunctions, the player is confronted with the horrors of their own actions, prompting 
the player to ‘switch sides’ and fight alongside erstwhile ‘rebel enemies’. The player’s 
complicity in war’s horrors is further brought into question via confrontation with 
dramatic visual effects including increased shadows, destroyed clothes, and bodily 
distortions that accumulate during play. The disorienting impact of these effects is 
accentuated, importantly, by deliberate adjustments to time’s durational character in these 
titles. Thus, while such games typically advance at considerable speed, the tempo of 
critical military shooters is often markedly reduced in those passages of play in which the 
player is forced to experience the impact of their own violences, and to confront the 
explicit and graphic depiction of dead bodies, including civilian casualties (e.g. Haze, 
September 12th and SO:TL). 
 Turning to broader articulations of temporality, critical military shooters share 
with the mainstream a portrayal of perpetual danger: all of the above titles rely upon a 
shared sense of permanent insecurity. At the same time, their emphasis on the self’s 
culpability in provoking and escalating war injects some element of (narrative) 
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the past as presented here serves once more as a lesson for the present or future, now the 
lesson’s object is endogenous – and organised around the self’s continuing failure to act 
with responsibility or restraint – not exogenous via reference to an anarchical world 
populated by antagonistic powers bringing insecurity to the self. At the same time, the 
linear sequencing that dictates gameplay within these titles means that progression 
throughout the game depends upon further violence and aggression. Indeed, the only way 
to prevent escalation of conflict here is for the player to put down their controller and 
refuse to fight. In this sense, critical military shooters offer a damning critique of the 
edifices of contemporary warfare and American exceptionalism. Importantly, though, 
America’s unique status comes here not from its moral righteousness or unique 
vulnerability to unprovoked attack. Instead, it is a product of its matchless capacity to 
cause, escalate and wage war. Put otherwise, exceptionalism comes not from threats to 
the USA, but is instead seen in threats from the USA to the stability of the international 
order. These games – through their possibility space (gameplay) and procedural rhetoric 
(messages, visuals and narratives) – thus offer the potential to provoke a politically 
reflexive criticality in players who are forced to reflect through the narrative and 
gameplay of these games on the efficacies of past, present and future conflicts.  
 Given this, critical military shooters are somewhat more ambiguous in their 
depiction of allies and enemies than their mainstream counterparts. They often begin with 
an ostensibly clear player/enemy demarcation, which, as with mainstream military 
shooters, typically involves the player representing the US army. Yet, as the game 
unfolds, this demarcation often blurs. The player’s own actions may, for instance, be 
revealed to be ethically problematic, as similarities between the player and their enemies 
become apparent (as in SO:TL); or the player may change allegiance (e.g. Haze) to fight 
former allies. Furthermore, these games are also more generally ambiguous in their 
portrayal of combatants; their structure more akin to a ‘new wars’ cast of allies and 
enemies including, for example, Private Military and Security Companies.   
 Concerning time as a setting, although critical military shooters share with the 
mainstream a depiction of ‘war without end’, this claim for permanent war is not made 
through the production of games representing multiple timeframes. In fact, they almost 
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time is used in some cases allegorically or metaphorically: the ‘present’ of SO:TL, 
September 12th and Blacksite: Area 51 and the future of Haze all serve to critique our 
past, present and anticipated future actions (see Davis 2010, 149-151). Moreover, while 
technology is also a crucial element of most critical military shooters, such games avoid 
the techno-fetishism of the mainstream by forcing confrontation with the violent 
consequences of high-tech weaponry, remote warfare and the like. These games often, 
therefore, demonstrate the scope of civilian casualties — most notably in the case of 
SO:TL, in which the player uses white phosphorous with devastating consequences. Here, 
although ostensibly attacking enemy soldiers, the targets are subsequently revealed to be 
civilians. Technologically mediated war thus does not mitigate risk. It is, in fact, directly 
implicated in the devastating loss of civilian life in contemporary warfare, and the ensuing 
erosion of human security.   
 
Critical Procedural Military Games 
Critical procedural military games such as the Metal Gear Solid (MGS) series (1987-
present) and Splinter Cell series (2002-present) are, like mainstream games, designed and 
released with commercial intent. Such games may have a significant marketing budget – 
the MGS series, in particular, has been hugely successful, selling 41.3 million copies 
worldwide – yet they utilise very different gameplay mechanics which place a premium 
on slower, more strategic forms of gameplay.9 
 Critical procedural military games generally place the player in the role of a lone 
special forces operative whose primary goal is to infiltrate an enemy facility before either 
rescuing captives or destroying a piece of hi-tech weaponry threatening global security. 
Future war is, therefore, preventable within these games and contingent upon a player’s 
actions and agency, often assisted by non-playable allies and their intelligence, advice 
and assistance which may help in overcoming enemies, field survival, utilising weapons 
and so forth. The identity of belligerents, in these games, blurs ‘old’ and ‘new’ war 
paradigms. Enemies are predominantly soldiers representative of a clearly identifiable 
organisation (albeit one not necessarily mappable to a state), and clearly distinct from 
civilians who are seldom the victims of war. The motivation for enemy actions, however, 
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ideology, but for identity’ (Kaldor, cited in Jarvis and Holland 2015, 131). Frequently, 
the ‘enemy’ turns out to be war itself, personified by the Military Industrial Complex, 
with the antagonists representing stakeholders in the state’s militarisation. On the surface, 
therefore, there are parallels here with those mainstream shooters which expose a Military 
Industrial Complex as integral to the onset of contemporary war. Yet, whereas the action-
centric gameplay within mainstream military shooters trumps narrative story, critical 
procedural military games retain a powerful synergy between gameplay and narrative. 
 These games offer a very different experience of time’s duration than the 
‘shooters’ discussed above. The MGS series, in particular, is renowned for its extensive 
use of narratives presented in cut-scenes designed to make both explicit and allegorical 
references to the dangers of war. The cut-scenes in MGS3, for example, amount to 
roughly 5 hours in length out of a total playtime of approximately 16 hours. In MGS4 
they account for approximately 8 hours of 20 hours total playtime. Critical procedural 
military games, like all of the games discussed in this article, thus both communicate 
allegorically but are also a contributor to allegorical forms of political communication 
about the causes of war. The criticality served by this manipulation of time’s passing for 
players is complemented here, however, by more explicit critique of the growth of 
technologically-mediated war. Games within the MGS series, for example, frequently 
expose the dangers of technologically augmented cyber soldiers, mechanised remote war-
fighting, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Thus, unlike critical military 
shooters, the player seldom makes use of hi-tech weaponry themselves, with their 
technology restricted to items such as binoculars or scanning equipment designed to aid 
concealment and stealth, rather than weaponised for lethal purpose.  
 Like both critical and mainstream military shooters, though, critical procedural 
games re-affirm the geopolitical condition as a period of enduring insecurity. Concerning 
time as a dramatic setting, the majority of these titles are situated in a 9/11-influenced 
‘near present’, with all of the Splinter Cell games and both MGS and MGS2 covering 
events framed to the player as happening ‘now’ or in the ‘near future’. In all cases, these 
games use extensive allegorical reference points to illustrate that the motivations of those 
seeking absolute power and the dangers of militarisation are permanent, inescapable 
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This is particularly evident in the four MGS games released after 9/11, each of 
which explicitly vacated the 9/11 present for their setting – with three games set during 
the Cold War (MGS3 (1963), MGS5: Ground Zeroes (1975), MGS5: Phantom Pain 
(1984)) and one set in the future (MGS4 set in 2014; released in 2008) – while still 
resonating strongly with that present. For example, MGS5: Ground Zeroes places the 
player as a stealth operative (Big Boss, aka Snake) attempting to rescue two prisoners 
from a fictional American ‘Blacksite’ in Cuba (Camp Omega), with the gameworld 
providing an open world realisation of the whole island complex. The game’s critical 
purchase is shown in its narrative, which offers a critique of the internment of captives in 
the contemporary war on terror. And, while set in 1975, the game’s setting – perhaps 
intentionally – evokes powerful allegorical feelings around the US military prison at 
Guantanamo Bay — itself, of course, in Cuba.  
In comparison to the other categories of game explored above, critical procedural 
military games are of additional interest to this article for a particularly pronounced 
engagement with memory and forgetting. Unlike mainstream military shooters which – 
although often set in the past – typically foreclose discussion of previous errors and 
failings, games such as MGS coalesce pasts, presents and futures as sources of permanent 
regret. In all of these games the lead protagonist Snake (in his various incarnations) 
ruminates explicitly on his own history and that of his former allies (now corrupted by 
power) to consider how his current actions may bring closure to his martial past through 
avoiding present conflict. Memory also features in these games, moreover, through their 
non-linear release – MGS and MGS2 were set in the present; MGS3 in the past; MGS4 in 
the future, and the two MGS5 games both set in the past. The player is thus able to 
remember what their in-game avatar cannot, and is also able to ‘know’ the future which 
Snake cannot.  
Where critical procedural military games perhaps differ most from either 
mainstream or critical military shooters is in their pattern of gameplay, which places a 
high premium on stealth rather than shooting. The player is seldom engaged in gunplay: 
when they are, they are rapidly outnumbered and killed. As such, the player is actively 
encouraged to avoid conflict. Gameplay, rather than being rapid and action-centred, is 
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slower and the choices available to the player are frequently wide. This can be shown 
both in the variety of ways in which the player can navigate the game space, and in the 
scope of options open to the player to overcome set objectives (vis-a-vis linear or 
‘corridor-based’ titles). In consequence, the possibility space of such games is frequently 
wider than that of mainstream military shooters, notwithstanding the frequent scripting 
out of the capacity to play as a shooter. The player’s character, moreover, is frequently 
represented in the third person, making the game ‘easier’ by broadening the field of vision 
and thereby aiding stealth-oriented gameplay. Crucially, playing in the third person also 
affirms a different kind of affinity between player and character compared to a first-
person shooter – rather than placing the player in the ‘boots of the soldier’ – the norm in 
a mainstream military shooter – the player here plays out the protagonist’s story.  
 
Civilian-centred military games 
This genre is the most recent of our four, and exemplified by two recent releases: Sunset 
(2015) and This War of Mine (TWOM) (2014).10 While these games have relatively 
modest sales despite commercial intent (18,600 and 1.8m respectively – the former being 
declared a critical and commercial failure; the latter a critical and commercial success) – 
both offer an explicitly artistic and critical intervention into contemporary militarism.11 
Each provides important rejoinder to the predominant focus on soldiers’ stories within 
war videogames, casting the player as a civilian forced to navigate a warzone not of their 
making. This impression of perpetual insecurity feeds into a similarly ahistorical – and 
similarly realist – impression in these games wherein suspicion and self-interest are 
abandoned only at considerable risk to the player. Allies, such as they exist, are limited 
to other civilians who may aid the player. Yet the perils of humanitarian catastrophe mean 
that - in TWOM in particular – war-generated desperation will often lead to conflict 
between civilians, rendering fellow ‘victims’ potential future enemies. In focusing on 
civilian casualties, they therefore question the productivity of war itself, giving voice to 
protagonists overwhelmingly absent in other war-based videogames. 
 Both Sunset and TWOM challenge the player – situated here as a civilian - with 
survival in a contemporary war-scape. In terms of temporality, this leads to an emphasis  
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activity. Whilst Sunset is exclusively slow-paced, in TWOM rapid action is most closely 
associated with periods of fear and panic and is more likely to result in death than the 
survival promoted in mainstream and critical military shooters. In contrast to the games 
considered above, there is also no comparable celebration of technology here: players in 
TWOM are tasked with scavenging to survive, and technology, such as it is usable by the 
player, is rudimentary. Outside of the player’s influence, however, the consequences of 
technologically facilitated war are seen and experienced through the ravaging of the 
physical environment the player attempts to navigate. Here war’s technological 
advancement is not, therefore, accompanied by a similarly linear sense of normative 
progress.  
 Within civilian-centred military games conflict is explicitly to be avoided, as with 
the critical procedural military games. However, where critical procedural games afford 
the player latitude to respond with violence where necessary, in Sunset no comparable 
capacity exists as violence is scripted out of the game: the player is cast as a civilian who 
observes war’s destructive force through the windows of a penthouse in which she is 
trapped in her role as a cleaner. TWOM, in contrast, explicitly exposes the considerable 
asymmetry in capacities for violence between civilians and combatants in contemporary 
war zones. In this sense, therefore, the possibility space of these games is relatively 
narrow. Where Sunset prevents violence through its gameplay, TWOM forces the player 
into desperate measures to ensure their own survival. Yet TWOM strongly dissuades 
killing, as if the player engages in violence it is likely to result in death to the player or 
other civilians. Even when conflict is avoided, stealing - which is essential to survival in 
TWOM – has the unwelcome result of depression for one’s character who is forced to 
reflect on the costs of their actions.  
 In terms of their temporal setting, whilst both of these games are set in the past, 
they encourage reflection on the present and future. Sunset is set in 1972-3 in a fictional 
African country (Anchuria), whereas TWOM is set in an inferred past in an unspecified 
war-torn state. The latter is explicitly described by the developer as a metaphor for the 
Sarajevo siege (1992-6) but may be as easily read as representative of the siege in Aleppo, 
for instance. These games, like critical procedural military games, can thus be seen both 
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cultural artefacts) to an age in which communication about war and conflict is 
increasingly framed figuratively.  
 Finally, perhaps uniquely, the implications of these games in terms of temporal 
considerations of American exceptionalism are ambiguous. Whilst critical of war (which 
may infer a critique of American exceptionalism), they seem to suggest a need for greater 
levels of international intervention to avert war and protect civilians. In TWOM, for 
example, conflict is ultimately brought to an end through the intervention of the United 
Nations, whereas in Sunset, US intervention is crucial to ending the conflict both through 
the player’s actions as a trapped US citizen (Andrea) and the actions of Andrea’s brother: 
a US citizen and leader of the resistance. In both games, therefore, a case to uphold 
American exceptionalist foreign policy as a force for benign good and moral purity is 
arguably offered – it is only through external Western intervention that civilians can be 
protected against otherwise certain death.  
 
Playing with time 
As the above suggests, military videogames are both located in, and constitutive of, 
multiple and overlapping temporal conditions and experiences. To return to the three roles 
of temporality introduced above, all of the games discussed here may be approached – as 
may all popular culture – as a product of a particular temporal horizon. Interestingly – 
given the heterogeneous normative, political and aesthetic experiences on offer – that 
horizon emerges as a relatively coherent one across our sub-genres: it is one dominated 
by the immediate and then receding shadow of the 11 September 2001 attacks and 
subsequent ‘9/11 wars’.12 Thus, on the one hand, these videogames are marked by 
engagement – both sympathetic and critical – with a range of particularly prominent 
themes in post-9/11 political discourse. Tropes around American exceptionalism, 
American innocence, and American insecurity, for instance, have been a mainstay of 
political and media debate in this period, and it is – therefore – unsurprising to see their 
presence so starkly in this genre. At the same time, these games offer direct engagement 
with developments in contemporary warfare – from the emergence of high-tech weaponry 
such as drones, to the growing recognition of the realities of PTSD – allowing, in some 
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including around WMD programmes in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet, it is also important to 
note that this post-9/11 horizon has not been entirely unchanging, and the most critical 
and disruptive military videogames in our analysis – civilian-centred military games – 
are those which emerged most recently, some thirteen to fourteen years after the 9/11 
attacks, and five years after the end of President Bush’s second term of office. 
 There is nothing unique to videogames in this sense: popular culture is always 
influenced, at least, by the historical circumstances of its production, which may include 
prevailing ideas, available technologies, aesthetic tastes, and so forth. As Michael Shapiro 
(2009, 48-9) has observed, the time (actual date) at which we experience a particular 
cultural form (a game or a film) and the time (or date) at which the form was produced 
matter. Thus, where films engaging with war date back to the pre-WWII period, games 
as a medium only date to the late 1970s. Indeed, it was arguably not until the 2000s, with 
the launch of Xbox 360, PS3 and advances in PC technology, that games had the technical 
and storage capacity to offer detailed, story-driven narrative engagements with visceral 
combat. The implications of this are profound, with games centred on pre-9/11 conflicts 
such as the Vietnam War all produced (and hence played) after the 9/11 attacks. The 
canon of – often critical – films on the Vietnam War, in contrast, was overwhelmingly 
produced during the 1970s and 1980s in a period of US national self-reflection in relation 
to that war.  
 The second significant manifestation of temporality concerned the dramatic 
setting(s) in which games and their narratives are situated. As we have seen, military 
videogames make use of – and (re)produce – diverse representations of pasts, presents 
and futures, drawing on imaginary future confrontations as well as ‘real’ historical events, 
especially from the twentieth century’s great geopolitical conflicts. Importantly, 
mainstream military shooters are most capable of moving between multiple 
representations of past, present and future – often within single series of games – while 
critical games tend to use their temporal setting allegorically, enabling insight into present 
and future confrontations. The former’s manoeuvrability, we argued, contributed to a 
cyclical shaping of temporality in which the transplanting of similar plots and events 
serves to construct global politics as a dynamic of return and recurrence. Thematic 
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vulnerability to external threat; American exceptionalism; the bellicosity of non-Western 
others (whether Russian; Chinese; North Koreans, or non-Western terrorists) – contribute 
to a sense of historical determinism. As, interestingly, does the organisation of gameplay 
within these titles in which corridor-based sequences of events propel the player along a 
seemingly linear path between past, present and future. The narrative and aesthetic 
structure of other games, in contrast, offers a far greater role for contingency and the 
agency of players, dramatically loosening the connections between storied and played 
pasts, presents and futures. 
 Despite their potential for creative engagement with past, present and future 
conflicts, mainstream military videogames (notwithstanding the minority of games which 
expose a Military Industrial Complex behind a state’s war mobilisations) on balance close 
space for critical reflection on the efficacies and ethics of warfare through gameplay, 
whereas critical games (through a synergy of narrative and gameplay) typically serve to 
open such space. In the case of mainstream shooters, neither Vietnam nor contemporary 
wars in Afghanistan or Iraq are positioned as events meriting regret. Indeed, military 
action is, almost universally, presented as a justifiable and necessary response to 
(typically, American) insecurity. Critical games, in contrast, suggest that peace is the 
norm, that enemies are actually frequently present within the very fabric of the US war 
machine (the Military Industrial Complex), and that American exceptionalism invokes 
ethically problematic foreign policy.  
 Third, thinking of time as duration in these games, mainstream and critical games 
facilitate sharply contrasting encounters with the experience of time for their players. If, 
as argued above, mainstream shooters close down space for critical reflection by virtue 
of their storying of particular events, their meaning and sequencing, this is compounded 
by the accelerated processes characteristic of ‘gametime’ in this sub-genre. The 
procedural rhetoric which emphasises unreflective action within the ‘shoot first, ask 
questions later’ dynamic typical of these games leaves scant opportunity for ethical or 
political questioning within these games about their ostensible objects (war in the past, 
present or future) or, indeed, for considering the persuasive potential of these games (in 
Bogost’s terms). War, here, is an exciting encounter characterised by urgency, danger, 
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use speed to expose the perils of rapid decision taking or employ more cerebral playstyles 
to open space for critical reflection.  
 
Conclusion 
This article has explored a number of intersections between military videogames and 
temporality. Two overarching arguments were made. First, that time plays at least three 
roles in this genre – acting as horizon, setting and experienced duration – all of which are 
central to the ways in which war is made meaningful therein. As demonstrated above, 
such games: imagine past, present and future events in specific ways; connect past, 
present and future events according to diverse patterns; accelerate or decelerate 
experiences of war to either facilitate or foreclose critical reflection; and, are situated 
against a very specific ‘real world’ backdrop dominated by a growing distance from the 
events of 11 September 2001. The article’s second argument was that these productions, 
representations and experiences of temporality are vital for the political and aesthetic 
engagements with war available to videogame consumers. Military videogames, as we 
have seen, both: celebrate and mourn militarism; force and prevent player engagement in 
violence; and, encourage and discourage reflection on the implications of the violences 
of self and other. Thus, variation in the way temporality is put to work in these games is 
key for the critical potential – or lack thereof – within this genre, which emerges as more 
heterogeneous than often assumed. 
 As a first effort to analyse imbrications of militarism and temporality within 
videogames, this analysis points to a number of potentially productive directions for 
future research. In the first instance, there is obvious scope for far more explicit 
comparative analysis between representations of temporality in military videogames and 
other war-oriented forms of popular culture, including film, television shows, theatre, or 
literature. Such analysis would shed further light on the distinctiveness (or otherwise) of 
this medium, and of the significance of temporal horizons, in particular, for dynamics of 
cultural production and consumption. Second, there is possibility for further work 
explicitly engaging with military videogames portraying more speculative – temporally 
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invasion (e.g. Halo 2, Halo 3; the Gears of War and Killzone series). These future-focused 
games offer distinct articulations of identity to many of those considered above. 
 Third, portrayals of present and/or future war also suggest scope for greater 
reflection on the recreational representation of advanced military weaponry such as 
UAVs and the implications of this.  A fourth – and perhaps most pressing – line of enquiry 
would be to focus on audiences, and the implications for players of the diverse ways in 
which games engage with temporality and war. Such work could build from existing work 
around the ‘sociology of gaming’. Galloway (2006, 78-84) on military videogames, and 
player feelings or positionalities offers a useful starting point (see also Crane-Seeber, 
2016, 49-50).  Future research could also explore player understandings and experiences 
of temporality in the narratives and actions presented by videogames, and the extent to 
which these are internalised, interrupted or resisted in the playing of these games and 
beyond. How, for instance, are the multifaceted forms of temporality identified above 
brought to bear in the decoding of other violences encountered on news media and in 
film? And how do temporal claims, for example in terms of representation of past conflict 
or the use of hi-tech weaponry, figure in the discussion of videogames in dedicated 
forums online and offline? Such questions are some way beyond this article which offers 
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10 Both Home Behind (2016) and Valiant Hearts (2014) also feature civilians as the main protagonists but 
they feature a more action-centric pattern of play and are thus very different in feel. 
11 Sales data for both of these titles are conservative estimates derived from steamspy.com which captures 
PC-based download figures activated on Steam. TWOM, in particular, was distributed as a ‘free title’ on 
PlayStation Network (February 2017) and so will thus have higher user figures than estimated here.  
12 As Stahl (2006, 118) argues: ‘September 11, 2001 and the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq ushered 
in a boom in sales of war-themed video games for the commercial market’. 
